With the rapid growth of electronic commerce and associated demands on variants of Internet based applications, application systems providing network resources and business services are in high demand around the world. To guarantee robust security and computational efficiency for service retrieval, a variety of authentication schemes have been proposed. However, most of these schemes have been found to be lacking when subject to a formal security analysis. Recently, Chang et al.
Introduction
Following advances in network technologies and the widespread availability of remote system backup, many service applications have been developed to make legitimate user access network service more convenient and efficient. As a password-based authentication scheme provides an efficient and accurate way to identify valid remote users, and at the same time preserves secrecy of communication, many password-based authentication mechanisms have been investigated in recent years. However, due to the inherent trade-off between security robustness and computational complexity, designing an authentication scheme which simultaneously possesses system reliability and performance efficiency poses a difficult challenge. Since the first authentication protocol was proposed by Lamport (1981) , the research community has focused considerable attention on this important research area. Liao and Wang (2009) developed a dynamic identity-based remote user authentication scheme. In their scheme, only lightweight cryptography modules, i.e., exclusive-or operation and hash function, are required to support mutual verification and session key agreement. In addition, the proposed scheme is based on two-factor security and a nonce-based mechanism. With an informal security analysis, the authors claimed that their scheme guaranteed computation efficiency and entity anonymity. In the same year, Hsiang and Shih (2009) demonstrated that Liao and Wang's scheme is insecure against insider attack, impersonation attack, and server spoofing attack, and cannot provide mutual authentication. Hsiang and Shih then introduced a remedy which is intended to repair the security vulnerabilities they discovered. They achieved the same level of computation efficiency by implementing a hash function and exclusive-or operation in the proposed scheme. Next, Sood et al. (2011) used a two-server paradigm design in which different levels of trust are assigned to the servers, and the user's verifier information is distributed between a pair of servers, called the service provider server and the control server. As the control server contains all users' secret informaiton and is not directly accessible to the clients, it is less likely to be attacked. Nevertheless, the insecurity of the schemes proposed in Hsiang and Shih (2009) and Li et al. (2010) was proved by Yeh et al. (2011) , He and Wu (2012) , and Li et al. (2012) , revealing that resistance to replay attack, impersonation attack, stolen smart card attack, and leak of verifier attack could not be provided. Chang and Lee (2012) presented a singlesign-on based authentication mechanism for distributed network environments. The concept of single sign-on can allow legal users to use a unitary token to access distributed service providers. A client-server architecture is assumed in the proposed scheme, and heavy exponential computation is adopted to deliver the strong security density of their protocol. Based on the proposed security arguments, their proposed mechanism seemed, prima facie, to be appropriately robust. However, pointed out that two types of attacks, i.e., user impersonation attack and credential recovering attack, can be invoked successfully against Chang and Lee's protocol. On the other hand, Juang et al. (2008) proposed a smart card based authenticated key agreement scheme. They provided a method to protect user identity during an authentication session. The security of Juang et al.' s mechanism is based on an elliptic curve cryptosystem and a symmetric cryptosystem. They claimed that the proposed scheme can achieve identity protection, session key agreement, resistance to insider attack, and low communication and computation cost via the elliptic curve cryptosystem. However, all these statements cannot be verified (Sun et al., 2009; Li et al., 2010) . Later, Tsai et al. (2013) found that Li et al. (2010) 's scheme is vulnerable to de-synchronization attack. In addition, the secret update mechanism of Li et al. (2010) 's scheme is not well designed and the scalability of the registration table is thus not efficient. For these reasons, Tsai et al. (2013) demonstrated an anonymous authentication scheme. The distinguishing feature of Tsai et al.' s scheme is that the server does not need to maintain a registration table, which makes the scheme suitable for a large scale service level. Wang (2012) conducted an interesting study to investigate the trust between smart cards and card readers; that is, the author wanted to examine the possibility of a user's information being compromised when an adversary possesses a stolen smart card with a compromised user password. Based on an adversary model consisting of three types of attackers, four important summary points were presented under the analyses of the robustness of four kinds of password based schemes against three attacker types: (1) a symmetric key based scheme is secure against the type I and II attackers, but not against a type III attacker; (2) a public key ID-based scheme (PSCAb) is secure against type I, II, and III attackers; (3) a public key HMQV-based scheme is secure against type I and II attackers, but not against the type III attacker; and (4) a public key based scheme with password validation data at server (PSCAV) is secure against type I, II, and III attackers. Later, Wang et al. (2012a) found that PSCAb has several practical pitfalls, and PSCAV is vulnerable in the type III security mode. In addition, they investigated numerous password-based authentication studies and presented 12 evaluation criteria for password based authentication schemes. Finally, a formally provable authentication scheme which satisfies the evaluation criteria was proposed. After that, examined the security of two authentication schemes proposed by Hsieh and Leu (2012) and Wang (2012) , and found that both schemes are vulnerable to offline dictionary attack under their assumption of the capabilities of the adversary model. In addition, they presented a comparative analysis of 'two-factor authentication schemes using smart cards' and 'common-memory-devicebased two-factor schemes' under two self-defined adversary models. Huang et al. (2013) identified two specific security scenarios for smart card based password authentication in distributed systems, i.e., (1) adversaries with pre-computed data stored in the smart card, and (2) adversaries with different data (with respect to different time slots) stored in the smart card. Two attacks were shown to be practical via attack implementations on two authentication schemes, and corresponding countermeasures were proposed. Wang and Ma (2012) presented a fivephase authentication scheme including registration, login, verification, password change, and user revoking phases. Unlike traditional password based authentication, a revoke phase was introduced to allow a user to revoke his/her stolen smart card. Then, investigated the possibility of designing an anonymous two-factor authentication scheme with the criteria from Madhusudhan Mittal's evaluation set. The authors found contradictions among the desired security properties. For example, the properties of 'local user password change' and 'resistance to smart card loss attack' are difficult to achieve simultaneously, while schemes without the local user password change property cannot provide the property of 'timely typo detection'. Later, analyzed the trade-off between system efficiency and user anonymity, and presented an important finding: public-key techniques are intrinsically indispensable for a two-factor authentication scheme with user anonymity. Moreover, Wang et al. (2012b) demonstrated that a password-based user authentication scheme proposed by Li et al. (2011) cannot withstand offline password guessing attack and denial-of-service attack, and fails to provide user anonymity and forward secrecy. Wang et al. (2012b) further presented a robust scheme to overcome the identified drawbacks. Recently, Chang et al. (2014) proposed a smart card based authentication scheme to resist user traceability attack. The authors claimed that their scheme can withstand various attacks such as user impersonation attack, server counterfeit attack, replay attack, and password guessing attack. Unfortunately, we find that Chang et al. (2014) 's scheme is vulnerable to server counterfeit attack, user impersonation attack, and man-in-themiddle attack. In addition, this scheme cannot provide user-untraceability. All of these weaknesses will be presented in the following sections.
Review of Chang et al. (2014)'s scheme
In this section, we review the registration phase and the login and authentication phase of Chang et al. (2014) 's scheme. Note that, for clarity, the password change phase of Chang et al.' s authentication protocol is not mentioned here. In addition, we present the notations used throughout this paper in Table 1 .
Registration phase:
Step 1:
Step 2: SU i : a smart card containing parame-
When a user U i wants to access the service of service provider S, U i chooses and sends his/her identity ID i and password PW i to S via a secure channel. After S receives the registration request, S computes N i =h(ID i ║x)h(PW i ). Finally, S stores parameters {N i , y, h()} into U i 's smart card and issues this smart card to U i securely.
Login and authentication phase ( Fig. 1 ):
Step 1: U i (with a smart card):
Step 2: U i (with a smart card)S:
When U i intends to access S, U i inserts his/her smart card into a card reader, and inputs ID i and PW i . The smart card then computes CID i =ID i h(N i ║y║T), N i '=N i h(y║T), B=N i h(PW i )=h(ID i ║x) and C= h(N i ║y║B║T). Next, the smart card sends {CID i , N i ', C, T} to S through a common channel.
Step 3: S: check (1) T'−T≤ΔT and (2) if no login request with the same parameters {CID i , N i ', C, T} is received at time from T−ΔT to T+ΔT.
Step 4: S:
and check the correctness of the received value C.
Step 5:
Step 6: U i : compute a * =h(B║y║T'') and check the correctness of the received value a.
Once S gets {CID i , N i ', C, T} at time T', S acts as follows:
1. S checks whether (1) T'−T≤ΔT and (2) if no login request with the same parameters {CID i , N i ', C, T} is received at time from T−ΔT to T+ΔT. 
, where T'' is the current timestamp. Otherwise, S rejects U i 's login request and records ID i * and the number of cumulative failed requests for the resistance to replay attack. If three requests related to ID i * fail in a pre-defined interval, S will ignore U i 's following request within a guard interval.
3. S sends {a, T''} to the smart card via a common channel.
Upon receiving {a, T''} from S, the smart card checks the freshness of T''. If T'' is fresh in an expected time interval, the smart card computes a * =h(B║y║T'') and compares a * with a. If values a * and a are the same, U i authenticates S.
Vulnerabilities of Chang et al. (2014)'s scheme
In this section, we demonstrate that Chang et al.'s scheme is insecure against user-traceability attack, user impersonation attack, server counterfeit attack, and man-in-the-middle attack.
User-traceability attack
Suppose there exists a legitimate but malicious user U k with a smart card containing {N k , y, h()}, where N k =h(ID k ║x)h(PW k ). Once U k intends to launch a user-traceability attack for a specific user U i , N k performs the following steps:
1. Eavesdrop on all messages, i.e., {CID i , N i ', C, T} and {a, T''}, transmitted between U i and S in any given session. Note that all the messages are involved with U i 's secret parameters:
where N i ', T, and CID i are public, and y can be retrieved from U k 's smart card. The derived procedure can be presented as follows:
(1) Compute h(y║T) with public value T, and secret y maintained in U k 's smart card.
(2) With computed h(y║T), N i can easily be derived via N i 'h(y║T) .
(3) Compute h(N i ║y║T) with T, y, and computed value N i . Now, all requests sent by U i will be connected to the retrieved ID i . Hence, the user-traceability property cannot be guaranteed in Chang et al.'s scheme.
User impersonation attack
Suppose there exists a legitimate but malicious user U k with a smart card containing {N k , y, h()}, where N k =h(ID k ║x)h(PW k ). Once U k intends to launch a user impersonation attack for a specific user U i , N k performs the following steps:
1. Eavesdrop on {CID i , N i ', C, T} transmitted between U i and S in any given session, where
2. U k retrieves y from his/her own smart card, and derives
where N i ', T, and CID i are public. As the server does not maintain a table to record all the registered users (and identities), now U k can utilize this identity ID i and a new password PW k ' to register as a new and legal user at S side. That is, U k can obtain a new set of parameters, i.e., {N k '=h(ID i ║x) h(PW k '), y, h()}, corresponding with ID i and PW k ' from the registration phase at S side. After that, it is obvious that h(ID i ║x) can be retrieved via N k ' h(PW k ') by the malicious user U k . Note that the adversary can alternatively exploit an off-line password guessing attack to correctly guess the password PW i , and then derive the h(ID i ║x) via N i h(PW i )= h(ID i ║x). Such password guessing based attack procedures for deducing h(ID i ║x) are also workable:
(1) U k derives N i and ID i from the attack procedure described in Section 3.1.
(2) U k uses this ID i and a new password PW k ' to register as a new and legal user at S side, and gets back a set of parameters
3. With the derived value h(ID i ║x), U k can totally impersonate the user U i with a counterfeit but
Note that ID i and N i are derived by U k at the beginning of step 2, B k =h(ID i ║x) is derived at the end of step 2, and T k can be correctly derived with a series of eavesdropped timestamps.
Based on the foregoing, we can conclude that the resistance to user impersonation attack cannot be guaranteed in Chang et al.'s scheme.
Server counterfeit attack
Suppose there exists a legitimate but malicious user U k with a smart card containing {N k , y, h()}, where N k =h(ID k ║x)h(PW k ). Once U k intends to launch a server counterfeit attack for a specific user U i , N k performs the following steps:
2. Similar to step 2 of the user impersonation attack described in Section 3.2, U k retrieves y from his/her own smart card, and derives N i and ID i . Then, U k can utilize a new registration at S side or password guessing based attack procedures to obtain h(ID i ║x).
3. With the derived value h(ID i ║x), U k can totally cheat the user U i into confounding U k with a legal server with a valid response message {a k , T k ''}, where a k =h(h(ID i ║x)║y║T k ''). Note that T k '' can be correctly derived after observing a series of transmitted timestamps.
In brief, the resistance to server counterfeit attack cannot be guaranteed in Chang et al.'s scheme.
Man-in-the-middle attack
Suppose there exists a legitimate but malicious user U k with a smart card containing {N k , y, h()}, where N k =h(ID k ║x)h(PW k ). Once U k intends to launch a man-in-the-middle attack for a specific user U i , N k performs the following steps:
1. Similar to the above attacks (e.g., user impersonation attack and server counterfeit attack), N k first eavesdrops on {CID i , N i ', C, T} transmitted between U i and S in a previous session, where
and C=h(N i ║y║B║T).
2. U k retrieves y from his/her own smart card, and derives N i and ID i . Then, U k can utilize a new registration at S side or password guessing based attack procedures to obtain h(ID i ║x).
3. Once a new session is held between U i and S, N k acts as follows:
Note that T k is a valid timestamp chosen by U k , and ID i , N i , and h(ID i ║x) are derived.
(2) Once S gets {CID k , N k ', C k , T k } at time T', S checks whether (1) T'−T k ≤ΔT and (2) if no login request with the same parameters {CID k , N k ', C k , T k } is received at time from T−ΔT to T+ΔT. Obviously, these two conditions hold.
(
and U k will be successfully authenticated as C * =C. Then, S computes a=h(B * ║y║T''), where T'' is the current timestamp. S sends {a, T''} to the smart card via a common channel.
(4) After U k receives {a, T''}, U k pretends that he/she is the server S, and sends a valid response 
The proposed scheme
In this section, we introduce a novel authentication scheme consisting of a registration phase, a login and authentication phase, and a password change phase. The newly proposed scheme guarantees security robustness without the weaknesses identified in the previous section. The assumptions of our scheme are: (1) We adopt a limited number of cumulative failed requests as a management policy for resisting the offline password guessing attack; (2) Once the user's smart card is lost (or stolen), the user will report the loss, and suspend the lost smart card online to avoid malicious manipulations of it; (3) Our scheme does not consider side-channel attacks.
Registration phase: When a user U i wants to access the service of S, U i chooses and sends his/her identity ID i , password PW i , and two chosen random numbers r 1 and r 2 to S via a secure channel. After S receives the registration request, S computes M i = h(y║r 2 )h(PW i ║r 1 ) and N i =h(ID i ║x)h(PW i ║r 1 ). Finally, S stores parameters {N i , r 1 , M i , h()} into U i 's smart card and issues this smart card to U i securely. At the same time, S stores h(h(y║r 2 )) without any information connected to U i . That is, S first deletes the registration information related to U i , and then maintains the secret value h(h(y║r 2 )) as a random number in a pre-defined table T; hence, S cannot recognize U i via h(h(y║r 2 )) or any other information from this table.
Login and authentication phase ( Fig. 2 ):
When U i intends to access S, U i inserts his/her smart card into a card reader, and inputs ID i and PW i . The smart card then generates a robust stronglyrandom number r 3 , and computes A=M i h(PW i ║r 1 )= h(y║r 2 ), D=r 3 h(A), B=N i h(PW i ║r 1 )=h(ID i ║x), N i '= N i h(h(A)║r 3 ), CID i =ID i h(N i ║h(A)║r 3 ), and C= h(N i ║h(A)║B║r 3 ). Next, the smart card sends {D, CID i , N i ', C} to S through a public channel.
Step 3: S: compute r 3
)) * ║B * ║r 3 * ), and check the correctness of the received value C.
Step 4: S: examines (1) the freshness of r 3 * , and (2) if no login request with the same parameters {D, CID i , N i ', C} is received.
Step 5: SU i : a=h(B * ║h(h(y║r 2 )) * ║r 4 ), r 4 .
Step 6: U i : compute a * =h(B║h(A)║r 4 ) and check the correctness of the received value a.
Once S gets {D, CID i , N i ', C}, S iteratively retrieves each value h(h(y║r 2 )) * from the maintained ║r 1 ) , and stores M i_new and N i_new in the smart card's memory. Note that a threshold value of the number of cumulative failed requests can be set to 3. If the number of failed requests exceeds 3, the smart card will be locked and only a specific user reverification procedure can be used to unlock this smart card. This mechanism can be exploited to be secure against an offline password guessing attack as the number of instances of password guessing and testing is limited.
Formal analysis of our proposed authentication scheme
In this section, we present the formal analysis of our proposed authentication scheme based on Burrows et al. (1990) , Bellare and Rogaway (1994) , Blake-Wilson et al. (1997) , Bellare et al. (2000) , and Chang and Lee (2012).
Communication model
In the communication model, we assume that a user U i intends to access a service provider S j . For this goal, some concepts must be formally defined:
1. Protocol participants: there exist a set of users, called Client, and a set of service providers, called Server, in the protocol P in which the participant is either a user or a service provider. Each participant may possess several instances, called oracles, which are involved in distinctly concurrent executions of P. Here, i U  is denoted as the instance i of a participant U.
2. Long-term secret keys: Each S j Server possesses secret values x and y as the long-term secret keys trusted by all U i 'sClient.
3. Acceptance and termination: There exist two states, ACC _ 
Adversary model
In this paper, we assume that the adversary is able to interact with the participants via oracle queries. The following major queries model the capabilities of the adversary:
Send ( Hash(m): The one-way hash function can be viewed as a random function with the appropriate range in the ideal hash model. The adversary can use this query to get the hash result. Note that, if m has never been queried before, it returns a truly random number r to the adversary and stores (r, m) in the hash table. Otherwise, it returns the previously generated result to the adversary. 
Security properties
This subsection describes the security required in the proposed authentication.
Freshness: An oracle 
Based on the above analysis, the security of each authentication session can thus be defined as follows:
Session-security (SS): The adversary tries to guess the hidden bit b involved in a Test query via a guess b'. We say that the adversary wins the game of breaking the SS of an authentication protocol P if the adversary issues Test queries to a fresh oracle In brief, the advantage of an adversary A in attacking protocol P can be defined as
Formal security analysis
In this subsection, we formally analyze the security of our proposed authentication protocol. We define T A as the adversary's total running time, and q s and q h are the numbers of Send and Hash queries, respectively.
Theorem 1
Let A be an adversary attempting to break the SS of our proposed authentication protocol within a time bound T A , with less than q s Send queries with the communication entities, and asking q h times Hash queries. Then,
where l, l 1 , l 2 , and l 3 are the bit-lengths of the output of the hash function, the server's two secrets, and the largest-size transmitted message in P, respectively. Proof Let A be an adversary who intends to break the SS of protocol P within time T A . We can construct an SS-attacker B from A to respond to all of A's queries. A sequence of game reductions is involved in the proof. We introduce a sequence of game reductions starting at the real game G 0 . Game G 0 : This is the real attack game in the random oracle model. Several oracles are available for the adversary: all users and servers instances Execute, and Test queries can be simulated to imitate the behavior of real players. From this simulation, we know that this game is indistinguishable from a real attack unless the permutation properties of h() do not hold. As a result, according to the birthday paradox, the probability of a collision occurring is at most
Game G 2 : We avoid collisions amongst the hash queries asked by the adversary to the hashed values h(ID i ||x) or h(y||r 2 ). Assume that the adversary maintains query list Λ A . The adversary first chooses a random element r{0, 1} k , and checks if (*, r)Λ h Λ A holds. If it holds, we abort this game. The games G 2 and G 1 are indistinguishable unless game G 2 aborts. Therefore, the game will be aborted with the probability bounded for
We avoid collisions amongst the hash queries asked by the adversary to the server's ephemeral secrets, i.e., x and y. Assume that no collision has been found by the adversary for the server's ephemeral secrets. 
Proof
We prove mutual authentication for our protocol based on BAN logic (Burrows et al., 1990) . Basic constructs and logic postulates are defined as follows (Note that in this section the symbols P and Q range over principals, X and Y range over statements, and K ranges over encryption keys):
Constructs: P believes X: The principal P believes that X is true.
P sees X: Someone has sent a message containing X to P, who can read and repeat X (possibly after doing some decryption).
P said X: P has actually sent a message including statement X in the current session of the protocol or before.
P controls X: P has jurisdiction over X; i.e., the principal P is an authority on X and this matter should be trusted. fresh(X): X has not been sent before the current session of the protocol.
The key K is shared between the principals P and Q. P   X Q: The formula X is a secret known only to P and Q. Only P and Q may use X to prove their identities to each other.
{X} K : This symbol represents the formula X encrypted or protected under the key K.
Logical postulates: Rule 1 (Message-meaning rules)
If P believes P   K Q and P sees {X} K , then we postulate P believes Q said X. Rule 2 (Nonce-verification rule)
If P believes fresh(X) and P believes Q said X, then we postulate P believes Q believes X. Rule 3 (Jurisdiction rule) If P believes Q controls X and P believes Q believes X, then we postulate P believes X. Rule 4
(1) If P sees (X, Y) then P sees X.
(2) If P believes P   X Q and P sees {X} K , then P sees X. Rule 5 If one part of a formula is fresh, then the entire formula must also be fresh. If P believes fresh(X), then P believes fresh(X, Y).
Before analyzing the authentication scheme, the assumptions are given as follows:
Assumption 2 U i , S j believe fresh(r 3 ), fresh(r 4 ). Assumption 3 S j believes U i controls r 3 . Assumption 4 U i believes S j controls r 4 . Our proposed authentication scheme is realized as follows:
Step 2: S j U i : {a, r 4 }. The formal analysis of mutual authentication is as follows:
(1) S j sees {D, The final results are as follows:
S j believes {D, CID i , N i ', C} (from (7)). U i believes S j believes {a, r 4 } (from (12)). U i believes {a, r 4 } (from (14)). With the four results (5), (7), (12), and (14), the remote user U i and the service provider S j can be authenticated by each other. □
Claim 1
The proposed authentication scheme guarantees data security.
In our proposed authentication scheme, all transmitted messages {D, CID i , N i ', C} and {a, r 4 } are well protected via high-entropy secrets x and y chosen by S. Without knowing the two secrets, attackers cannot obtain any useful information from transmitted ciphertexts. In addition, due to the irreversibility of the one-way hash function, it is difficult for attackers to derive any secrets such as random numbers and secret values. Therefore, data confidentiality can be ensured in our proposed authentication scheme.
Claim 2
The proposed authentication scheme guarantees user anonymity and resistance to replay attack.
In each session of the proposed authentication scheme, four random numbers r 1 , r 2 , r 3 , and r 4 are utilized to randomize the messages transmitted between the user and the server. Without revealing the real identities in public, all the communicating entities need only to know whether the involved partners are legitimate or not. In more detailed terms, in our proposed authentication scheme all the identities are transmitted in cipher format instead of plaintext, and these identities will be randomized in each new session. As a result, our authentication scheme can guarantee the property of user anonymity and prevent user-traceability attack. On the other hand, in each session, we exploit random numbers, i.e., r 3 and r 4 , to perform the computation of all transmitted messages. As these two random numbers are newly generated in each session, the resistance to replay attack is naturally embedded in our proposed authentication scheme. That is, owing to the freshness verification of r 3 and r 4 , the replay attack can easily be detected and prevented.
Claim 3
The proposed authentication scheme guarantees resistance to man-in-the-middle based attacks such as server counterfeit attack, user impersonation attack, and man-in-the-middle attack.
An attacker may issue counterfeit messages to deceive the legal communication users or the server. However, without the knowledge of the two highentropy secrets x and y, it is difficult for the attacker to compute legitimate request or response messages such as {D, CID i , N i ', C} and {a, r 4 }. Even if the attacker sends a previously eavesdropped message to a victim party, the verification of these old messages will fail. This is because the random numbers r 3 and r 4 will have already been used in a previous session. In addition, the verification procedures have been modified to help the communicating parties to prevent man-in-the-middle based attacks. That is, as the secret values h(PW i ║r 1 ), h(y║r 2 ), and h(ID i ║x) cannot be derived by an adversary, all the man-inthe-middle based attacks, such as user impersonation attack, server counterfeit attack, and man-in-themiddle attack, identified in the previous section, will not succeed.
Claim 4
The user can freely change his/her password.
In Chang et al.' s protocol, the password change phase always involves the server. This design impedes the property of user convenience in the authentication protocol operation. In the proposed protocol, we totally modify the password phase so that the user can freely change his/her password without the help of the server.
Security and performance comparison
To further investigate the advantages of our proposed authentication protocol, we compare the proposed scheme with three relevant authentication schemes (Tsai et al., 2013; Chang et al., 2014; Kumari and Khan, 2014) in terms of major security and efficiency features. From a robustness standpoint (Table 2) , our proposed authentication scheme is superior to the other protocols by virtue of supporting all the major security features. It can be seen that our proposed authentication scheme possesses all the advantages and achieves the security requirements.
Performance evaluation is an important issue when designing a robust and efficient authentication scheme. This evaluation reflects the practicability of implementing the proposed authentication protocol in the real world. Hence, we also compare our proposed protocol with three of the most relevant proposals, i.e., Chang et al. (2014) 's scheme, Kumari and Khan (2014) 's scheme, and Tsai et al. (2013) 's scheme, in terms of protocol efficiency. The performance comparison among our proposed scheme and other schemes is listed in Table 3 . The metrics are hash function (HF), modular multiplication (MM), modular exponentiation (ME), elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) point multiplication (PM), XOR operation, and encryption/decryption (E/D). As the cost of performing one-way hash function and XOR operation is negligible in comparison with other heavy computation modules such as ME, PM, and E/D (Table 3) , our proposed authentication scheme can be said to be efficient. It is obvious that our scheme can achieve the same order of computation complexity as Chang et al. (2014) 's scheme, and delivers better security robustness.
Conclusions
Designing a secure but lightweight authentication scheme is a particular challenge owing to the difficult trade-off between security requirements and computation efficiency. A recent pioneering study proposed by Chang et al. (2014) broke new ground in this interesting research area. However, their scheme still has room for improvement. In this paper, we have demonstrated that Chang et al.'s authentication scheme fails to provide adequate security, such as user-untraceability, and is subject to user impersonation attack, server counterfeit attack, and man-in-the-middle attack. A novel authentication protocol is introduced for security enhancement. Our formal analysis and performance comparison have established that the security robustness and computation efficiency of our proposed authentication protocol can be guaranteed. In brief, we believe that our proposed protocol is both practical and suitable for current service application architecture.
